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WEEKLY REPORT



THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

6 October 1965

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(30 September - 6 October 1965)

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	v
Map, South Vietnam, facing page	1
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM	1
A. POLITICAL SITUATION	1
Premier Ky gives broad report on first 100 days in office (p. 1); Five criminals from Diem's regime executed (p. 2); Student paper in Hue steps up criticism of US as political situation in area deteriorates (p. 2); Terrorist activity noted in Saigon (p. 3); Special currency fund yields \$6.8 million (p. 3); Communist China purchases S. Vietnam piasters in Hong Kong (p. 4).	
B. MILITARY SITUATION	5
Record high Viet Cong casualties reported (p. 5); Viet Cong are reported dispersing forces to reduce vulnerability (p. 6); Seven more Viet Cong/PAVN units confirmed in S. Vietnam (p. 6); Kill ratio favors GVN (p. 6); Additional ROK and Australian troops arrive (p. 7);	

Page

C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

9

Ky government plans major revitalization of rural reconstruction program (p. 9); Cadre teams of 200 members may be introduced in districts (p. 9); US Embassy officials enthusiastic about proposals but have private reservations about execution (p. 10); Ky announces realignment of ministries (p. 10); Chieu Hoi returnee statistics (p. 10).

II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

11

S. Korean prime minister and party visited S. Vietnam (p. 11); Premier Ky is on four-day visit to Malaysia (p. 11); Confusion on GVN positions on negotiations (p. 11);

25X1C

25X1C

25X1C

[REDACTED] (p. 12);
GVN is a candidate for FAO Council (p. 12); Austrian aid still sought by S. Vietnam (p. 14); Spain and Argentina considering assisting S. Vietnam (p. 14).

Map, North Vietnam, facing page

15

III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

15

SAM site number 23 is located (p. 15); Five US aircraft downed by missiles since 24 July (p. 15); Hanoi and Liberation Front raise negotiations issue more frequently (p. 15); Chinese Communists maintain hard line on Vietnam (p. 16); Soviets emphasize defensive assistance to North Vietnam (p. 16);

ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)
US Combat Figures in Vietnam (Weekly)

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South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Incidents
(Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Weapons
Losses (Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Personnel
Losses (Monthly)

(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam
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-iii-

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
NOTE: Future issuances of the Intelligence and Reporting Subcommittee of the Interagency Vietnam Working Group will no longer include a Monthly Report. The regular Weekly Reports will include such retrospective reporting and analysis of long-term trends as may be necessary and feasible. The statistics which appeared in the Monthly Report will appear in the Weekly Report nearest to the appropriate date.

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Premier Ky, before departing on a brief official visit to Malaysia this week, turned his attention toward generating a sense of progress and momentum in the government's military and rural construction efforts. In addition to a major press conference in which Ky announced new military and cabinet appointments, reviewed his accomplishments to date and outlined future planning, Ky and other government officials presented US officials their proposals for a revitalized pacification program.

The pace of the war continued at a relatively intense level over the past week in terms of the number and intensity of Viet Cong-initiated actions. The number of Viet Cong casualties reached a record level, primarily from two major engagements, in the central coastal area and in the Mekong delta, in which South Vietnamese Government troops performed ably. US forces participated in no large actions, but continued their patrolling and clearing operations.

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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Premier Ky, in a major presentation attended by the press, on 1 October announced several previously planned military and cabinet changes and gave a report to the nation on his first 100 days in office. The new military appointments included the transfer of General Cao Van Vien from command of III Corps to the position of chief of the Joint General Staff, with 7th Division commander General Nguyen Bao Tri moving to the III Corps command. Ky also announced that General Nguyen Huu Co, who previously held the Joint General Staff title, was retaining his post as minister of war, but was being upgraded to the rank of deputy premier with added responsibilities for pacification.

2. The only surprise appointment was the substitution of a general officer, Armed Forces Chief of Operations Nguyen Duc Thang, for civilian adviser Le Van Tien to fill the vacant cabinet position of secretary of rural construction. This last-minute switch, after US officials had been advised of Tien's pending appointment, may have resulted from second thoughts by Ky over the possible ramifications of known Buddhist hostility toward Tien, if not from direct Buddhist pressure. Tien, a Catholic whom the Buddhist accuse of ties in former president Diem's Can Lao Party, has also alienated some Catholic circles which fear that he might use a government post for his own political purposes. Several generals on the Directorate had indicated a preference for a military man in the rural construction post, and may also have prevailed upon Ky to give the job to General Thang.

3. Ky's report to the nation, broadly reviewing the situation since Diem's overthrow, stressed the accomplishments of the present government to date, and its readiness, with the Communist military threat now less critical, to proceed with economic, social, and political programs to bring about a "new society" in the future. After outlining his programs, Ky answered questions from the press concerning such issues as prices, press censorship, his own tenure in office, and student criticism of the government.

4. In response to a question about the government's intention to establish an advisory council, Ky indicated considerable coolness toward the idea, which the government had earlier endorsed as a means of channeling civilian political activities along constructive lines. It appears that the military, which had previously spoken in terms of a council which might eventually evolve into a constituent assembly, are now having reservations about their ability to prevent an advisory council from becoming a forum for irresponsible attacks on the government. The military reportedly are still wrestling with a formula for a council with both elected representatives of the provincial and municipal councils, and hand-picked representatives of other civilian groups. One point at issue is whether the council would advise the Directorate or the cabinet.

5. In the pre-dawn hours of 1 October, the Ky government publicly executed five criminals sentenced to death under the Diem regime for major crimes. Since none of the five had known Viet Cong connections, the government evidently calculated that there would be no Viet Cong retaliation against US captives. A sixth prisoner, who had been convicted of a terrorist attack on a former US ambassador in 1961, was granted a last-minute stay of execution.

6. The second issue of a journal published by the student "struggle" group in Hue strongly attacked, for the first time, I Corps commander General Nguyen Chang Thi. Thi was accused of having tarnished the efforts of Premier Ky, during his recent visit to central Vietnam, to mend fences with the people of Hue; this attack was presumably prompted by Thi's strong warning, in Ky's presence, against further civil disturbances in Hue. The student paper additionally stepped up its criticisms of US policies and shortsightedness, blaming the US for its accidental bombing of the Demilitarized Zone, for endangering Vietnamese lives, and for causing much of the current shortage of goods and higher prices.

7. The US Consulate in Hue recently commented that, whereas economic and military conditions in I Corps seemed to be improving, the political situation in the corps threatens to deteriorate further.

The position of the Quang Tri Province chief, who has been under Buddhist pressure, remains tenuous, and the consulate expects Buddhists to step up their efforts to force his removal. There have been tenuous indications that the Viet Cong may have a hand in stirring up recent political trouble in Quang Tri, where one of the major charges is that the province chief is using the Political Action Teams in his area to terrorize the people. In the three other provinces of the corps, the Viet Cong appear to be stepping up efforts through popular demonstrations, to disrupt the war effort.

8. Police in Saigon are reported recently to have rounded up 19 port policemen on charges of misappropriating goods at the Saigon docks, eight students charged with involvement in terrorist acts targeted at the police, and the leader of a Viet Cong infiltration team which recently strung Communist banners, urging revolt against the government, within the city limits. There have been a number of recent terrorist bombings in Saigon, including a major explosion which killed nine Vietnamese and wounded 32 others outside the Saigon stadium--a police training area, a premature grenade explosion in a taxicab which killed three Vietnamese and wounded several persons including four Americans slightly, and a grenade --which failed to detonate--targeted at a US military vehicle.

Economic Situation

9. The Special Currency Fund set up at the end of August in conjunction with the inauguration of the Military Payment Certificate (MPC) System to curtail the flow of dollars exchanged on the black market yielded US \$6.8 million through September 24. The Mission believes that this figure understates the true demand for piasters through the new exchange arrangements for two reasons. First, piasters were in short supply at many of the conversion points; some points were closed for US enlisted personnel during most of the month. This should be corrected soon with a new supply of piaster notes arriving from London. Secondly,

there were probably some dollars held over from the pre-MPC period that were still converted in the black market. These should be nearly exhausted now, and the MPC system will force larger amounts into legal channels. Illegal mechanisms through which dollars are imported from abroad might be developed, adding to the black market rate and offsetting some of the expected improvement. However, the October volume is forecast at over US \$8.5 million.

10. While the Saigon black market volume in dollars has been reduced, the Hong Kong market for piasters continues to function and has been highlighted by increased purchases by Communist China. In late September, Communist China purchased an additional 100 million (US \$800,000) South Vietnamese piasters in Hong Kong. This brings total Chicom purchases for September to 280 million (US \$2.4 million), as compared to customary Chinese purchases of about 30 to 40 million piasters per month. It is possible that the Chinese purchases reflect apprehension that increased banking restrictions by the GVN and the issuance of MPC's (script) will dry up the usual channels for purchases of piasters in Hong Kong. The reasons for past and current Chicom purchases of piasters with delivery in Hong Kong are unknown, but it is likely that the Chinese operate their own agent activity in South Vietnam with some of these funds. They may also be acting in part as agents for the Vietnamese Communists in the purchases of piasters.

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. Military activity in South Vietnam during the past week resulted in record high Viet Cong casualties for the second consecutive week. The major Viet Cong actions were an estimated regimental-size Viet Cong attack in the Phu Cu Pass area, and an estimated battalion attack in Hau Nghia Province.

2. The number of Viet Cong-initiated incidents during the period 26 September - 2 October increased nearly 15 percent from the previous week's total; terrorism again accounted for 62 percent of all incidents.

3. In I Corps CTZ, the Viet Cong initiated attacks and ambushes against isolated outposts and RVNAF elements. There were estimated Viet Cong company attacks on two paramilitary outposts in Quang Ngai Province; friendly losses were light; Viet Cong casualties are unknown. In II Corps CTZ, the largest recent Viet Cong operation began in Binh Dinh Province on 28 September when an estimated four Viet Cong battalions attacked elements of the ARVN 22d Division moving in convoy. The most significant aspect of this attack was that it did not exhibit typical Viet Cong detailed planning and preparation. The Viet Cong may have been surprised by the movement of the ARVN unit, and apparently failed to prepare ambush positions. However, the different tactics could indicate that the operation was conducted by PAVN forces trained along more conventional military lines. There are indications that the enemy unit involved was the 18th Regiment of the 325th PAVN Division. In III Corps, a two-pronged attack by a Viet Cong battalion overran an outpost at Bao Trai, the capital of Hau Nghia Province. Suppressing mortar fire was placed on three artillery positions in the vicinity. Viet Cong activity in IV Corps continues to be directed at lightly defended, isolated outposts. On 2 October, the Viet Cong detonated two explosive devices in the Saigon/Cholon area.

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4. MACV reports that recent engagements with the Viet Cong have disclosed that they are dispersing their forces in small groups over large areas in an attempt to reduce vulnerability to air and artillery fire power.

5. MACV has accepted the presence in South Vietnam of seven more Viet Cong/PAVN units. The enemy strength figure increases by 5,500. Units confirmed are the 95th and 18th PAVN Regiments (325th Division), the 267th (Don Thap) and the F-25 Main Force Battalions, the 808th and the Phu Loi local battalions, and the C-2 Separate Company. The presence in South Vietnam of the two regiments was previously considered probable; each is believed to have a strength of 2,000. The 325th Division's other regiment, the 101st, was confirmed earlier, with a strength of 1,200.

6. Government military operations decreased in number and effectiveness, although contacts were more frequent, especially for small units. The kill ratio favored the GVN about 5.5 to 1, a drop from the previous week's 6.9 to 1, and weapons losses favored the Viet Cong slightly.

7. In I Corps, during a GVN operation, three Regional Force companies were surrounded by a estimated Viet Cong battation five miles southeast of Quang Ngai City. The enemy killed four defenders and wounded 18. Viet Cong losses are unknown.

8. In Binh Dinh Province, II Corps, elements of the 22d ARVN Division engaged significant VC forces. The 23d Ranger Battalion, while moving to relieve the 2/41 Regiment at Phu Cu, Binh Dinh Province, was attacked by a Viet Cong force believed to be the 18th Regiment, 325th PAVN Division. During the ensuing battle, friendly forces suffered 38 killed and 63 wounded. Reported Viet Cong losses were 250 killed and 5 captured.

9. The combined operation in the Ben Cat area, III Corps ended during the week. Revised friendly casualties for this two-week search-and-destroy operation are 13 killed (4 US, 2 NZ, 7 VN) and 67

wounded (15 US, 1 NZ, 51 VN). Confirmed enemy losses are 47 killed and 76 captured.

10. In Dinh Tuong Province, IV CTZ, the 7th ARVN Division encountered an estimated Viet Cong battalion supported by heavy weapons in heavily fortified positions. Before the Viet Cong could break contact during the night, they suffered heavy losses in several separate actions. Viet Cong losses were 83 killed and six captured. Friendly forces lost 28 (1 US) killed, 38 (4 US) wounded, and five missing. Two river craft were sunk and one was damaged.

11. The build-up of the government's offensive combat power continued this past week with the arrival of additional ROK and Australian troops. US forces participated in no major engagements this week, but continued aggressive patrolling, establishment of ambush sites, and development of base areas. The US 173d Airborne Brigade returned to Bien Hoa after two weeks' participation in the Ben Cat operation. The US 1st Cavalry Division assumed responsibility for its tactical area near An Khe, Binh Dinh Province. The 2d ROK Marine Brigade advance party continued to reconnoiter its base area and prepare for arrival of the remainder of the brigade in the Cam Ranh Bay area.

12. Three Dagger Thrust Operations (US unilateral amphibious raids) were accomplished during the week. Results of the first two, near Qui Nhon and Ninh Hoa, were negligible. The third, about 42 miles south of Quang Ngai City, netted 27 Viet Cong killed. No friendly casualties were reported.

13. Four B-52 Stratofortress missions were flown during the week, two over Quang Ngai Province and two over Tay Ninh Province. No significant contact was made by ground follow-up operations.

14. At the end of the week the following main roads were closed in the provinces indicated:
National Route 1 in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen,

Binh Thuan, and Binh Tuy; Route 9 in Quang Tri; Route 14 in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long; Route 19 west of Pleiku City; Route 7 in Phu Yen and Phu Bon; Route 21 in Darlac; Inter-provincial Route 1 in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long; and Provincial Route 10 in Hau Nghia. The national railroad was operational between Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between Thap Cham, Ninh Thuan Province, and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province; and between Hue, Thua Thien Province, and Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province.

C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. During the past week, the Ky government outlined to US Embassy officials extensive plans for the revitalization of the rural reconstruction program. In general, the plans as presented include the regroupment of all ministries concerned with the pacification effort under a new deputy premier for war and reconstruction, (see paragraph 5, below), and an intensification of pacification efforts in selected areas of the country without a retrenchment of the current effort in other areas. The three areas designated by Premier Ky to be the first to receive the intensified effort were: the Da Nang area of Quang Nam, Binh Dinh Province, and the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh area; possible additions to the list included the Phu Yen Province area, the Cai Son resettlement area (part of An Giang - Kien Giang provinces) and Phu Quoc Island.

2. Also new is the concept of introducing into each district of South Vietnam cadre teams, with possibly as many as 200 members, which would be specifically tailored to meet the needs of the area of their assignment. These teams would be operationally responsible to the newly established deputy prime minister for war and reconstruction.

The employment of these cadre teams as visualized may be a point of potential friction with the province and district chiefs in whose area they would be operating. The roles of the province chief and district chiefs in the new scheme for pacification were not outlined in these initial discussions by the government. Another problem relating to the proposal for pacification teams is the source of manpower. One of the difficulties encountered by the several cadre groups currently organized and operating in the pacification effort has been a shortage of trained individuals, and the loss of personnel working in the programs to the military draft.

3. Embassy officials are generally enthusiastic about the new proposals for improving the pacification effort which has been in the doldrums since early spring of this year. They have private reservations, however, about the role of the local officials in this new plan, as well as about the manner in which Ky will surface this program to the nation.

4. Premier Ky, on 1 October, announced a realignment of ministries within the government which is in phase with the plan outlined to members of the US Embassy earlier. General Nguyen Huu Co, was elevated to the role of deputy premier for war and reconstruction. Six ministries will be responsible to him in the future--Defense, Psychological Warfare, Rural Reconstruction, Public Works, Interior, and Youth. General Nguyen Duc Thang, of the Joint General Staff, was named to head the Rural Reconstruction Ministry. Thang's appointment, according to Co, is to last only six months, after which he will be replaced by a civilian. Thang in the meantime will retain his position on the JCS.

5. Chieu Hoi returnees for the week of 26 September through 2 October numbered 877 as contrasted with 2,163 last week. Included in the count were 224 military, 34 political cadres, 10 draft dodgers, and 609 civilians. Last week there were 220 military returnees, 66 political cadres, 1,870 civilian returnees, and seven in the draft dodger or deserter category.

6. A national Chieu Hoi center is now under construction in Saigon. A large permanent building is currently undergoing renovation and will house office and classroom facilities. A smaller building is also undergoing alteration to provide a vocational training site. Other permanent buildings for this facility are contemplated.

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II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. SOUTH KOREA

On 27-29 September, ROK Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon, accompanied by Minister of Commerce and Industry Pak Chong-hun and Minister without Portfolio Yun Chi-yong, stopped over in Saigon enroute to Malaysia. The visit was ostensibly to the ROK troops stationed in South Vietnam and was not billed as official; no communique was issued. In view of the presence of the minister of commerce and industry, Vietnamese-Korean trade relations were undoubtedly discussed. The visit appears to have been a success and to have pleased both sides.

B. MALAYSIA

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky arrived in Kuala Lumpur for a four-day visit on 4 October accompanied by his wife, Minister of Defense General Nguyen Huu Co, I Corps commander General Nguyen Chanh Thi, director general of police Colonel Pham Van Lieu, and other GVN officials. At a press conference in Kuala Lumpur, Premier Ky reportedly stated that South Vietnam is prepared to send personnel and material to help Malaysia defend itself against outside aggression and advocated once again that Asian countries join forces to defeat Communist imperialism. Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed moral support for South Vietnam, but it is doubtful that Malaysia will be able to expand greatly the material assistance it is now giving the GVN--mainly in the form of police training--in view of its preoccupation with the confrontation with Indonesia.

C. GVN NEGOTIATING STANCE


Foreign Minister Tran Van Do told Ambassador Lodge on 30 September that confusion has resulted abroad from the apparent contradiction between the uncompromising declarations by GVN military leaders such as Premier Ky and Chief of State General Nguyen Van Thieu on rolling back the Communists and the official position which advocates coexistence between North and South Vietnam.

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Do also urged the United States not to push the question of negotiations too strongly, because if Hanoi should agree, South Vietnam would be divided and unprepared.

The GVN has sent a message to the Conference of the Chiefs of State of the Organization of African Unity in Accra outlining its four conditions to bring about a just and lasting peace, which were first enunciated by Foreign Minister Do on 22 June. In essence, these conditions are: (1) an end to Communist aggression, (2) freedom for the South Vietnamese people to choose their own form of government without outside interference, (3) cessation of GVN defense measures and withdrawal of foreign troops as soon as Communist aggression ends, and (4) establishment of a system of effective and practical guarantees.



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E. ICC

Radio Saigon on 4 October announced that the GVN has sent a note to the ICC protesting the infiltration of all three regiments of the North Vietnamese 325th Division. The note reportedly included testimony of prisoners from the 325th Division and detailed information on its equipment, activities, and the routes employed in infiltrating.

F. GVN A CANDIDATE FOR FAO COUNCIL

The GVN has sent a note to US Embassy Saigon asking the United States to support its candidacy for

-12-

membership in the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization at the 13th FAO Conference to be held in Rome in November. The note stresses that Vietnam is essentially an agricultural nation which has taken steps to improve production methods and increase production despite disturbances fomented by the Communists, and that the GVN has actively participated in the work of FAO. Our embassy recommends that we support the GVN candidacy.

G. WORLD BUDDHIST YOUTH CONFERENCE
TO BE HELD IN SAIGON

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[REDACTED] a World Buddhist Youth Conference will be held in Saigon in the early part of 1966, preceded by a preparatory conference in November 1965. One hundred delegates are expected to attend the full conference, with sixty coming from Japan. The Buddhist leadership in South Vietnam reportedly hopes to demonstrate to the other delegates the ruthless character of the Communist war.

H. FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE

1. GVN Effort in Western Europe

Phan Van Thinh, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, will press for Free World Assistance in a number of Western European countries he plans to visit after the conclusion of the International Red Cross Conference (ICRC) at Vienna which he is attending. The last similar effort in Europe by a high-level GVN representative was the trip of Vinh Tho, former secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, in July 1964.

2. AUSTRALIA

Three hundred and fifty Australian troops arrived in South Vietnam on 29 September. The troops were promised by Prime Minister Menzies in August and are to augment the Australian infantry battalion already in action in South Vietnam.

3. AUSTRIA

GVN delegates to the ICRC Conference told US Embassy Vienna that they wish to pursue the offer of aid made by the Austrian Government last year to Vietnam. However, US Embassy Vienna reports that, [REDACTED]

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Austria might offer aid along the Swiss pattern, i.e., funds transmitted through the ICRC to be divided equally between the peoples of North and South Vietnam.


4. SPAIN

Spain may provide a coastal merchant vessel on a two-year loan to be manned by Spanish officers with a Vietnamese crew. This proposal will be discussed by the Spanish cabinet on 8 October.

5. ARGENTINA

President Illia has decided to offer assistance to South Vietnam. The precise nature of this aid is not yet known but would probably be "humanitarian," i.e., assistance to alleviate suffering of the South Vietnamese people.

NORTH VIETNAM



III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

A. MILITARY

A 5 October air strike against the transportation links stretching northeast from Hanoi to the China border drew vigorous response from the North Vietnamese. A new surface-to-air missile (SAM) site--number 23--located in the vicinity of Cac Ba Island east of Haiphong, fired approximately seven missiles at the strike aircraft, and downed one F8 Crusader. Five days before this a USAF F105 Thunderchief was downed by a missile in the vicinity of Ninh Binh. This plane, together with the one shot down on 5 October, brings to five the number of manned US aircraft downed by missiles over North Vietnam since the 24th of July.

B. POLITICAL

1. Following in the wake of the DRV 23 September Foreign Ministry memorandum on negotiations both Hanoi and the Liberation Front in their public statements have continued to raise the negotiations issue at a much more frequent rate than in the past several weeks. Statements from the Front on 29 September and again on 2 October included references to the issue of settling the war in wide-ranging attacks on the "inhuman" acts of the US in South Vietnam and the treatment of US prisoners of war. The statements reiterated the Front's generally hard terms for negotiations and insisted that the Front must be recognized "as the only authority competent to settle all questions concerning South Vietnam." This included any contact to discuss prisoners of war.

2. The spate of comment on the negotiations issued by Hanoi in the past week centered on interviews granted by Premier Pham Van Dong to Japanese and Egyptian newspapermen. Neither of these interviews departed from the standard DRV formula for settling the war. However, the fact that they were given so soon after the Foreign Ministry memo seems

-15-

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to indicate that Hanoi is now attempting to present a more positive image on the subject of negotiations. It may have felt that it had become too negative in the past by categorically discounting any offers of mediation for settling the war by third country representatives.

3. The Chinese Communists during the past week took occasion to reaffirm their hard line on Vietnam. Speaking at a banquet on 28 September in honor of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, Liu Shao-chi praised the Cambodian leader's public statements attacking the US offer of unconditional discussion and asserted that the Chinese Government and people "fully endorse" Sihanouk's position on Vietnamese negotiations which mirrors Peking's own line. Liu also reiterated Peking's standard attack on the Soviets by declaring that "some people" are giving covert support to the US "peace talks scheme" and trying to induce the Vietnamese people "to capitulate". The following day Foreign Minister Chen Yi in a stormy four-hour press conference also reaffirmed the general hard position of the Chinese on the Vietnam issue.

4. In a speech at the Soviet party plenum on 29 September, First Secretary Brezhnev reiterated Moscow's standard assertion that the USSR is "fulfilling its international duty" by rendering defensive assistance to North Vietnam. In an unusually specific remark, designed in part to undercut Chinese criticism, Brezhnev added that Moscow has already delivered a "considerable amount of weapons and military equipment." He again called for Communist unity in support of the DRV, but made it clear that Soviet efforts toward this end have been rebuffed by Peking.


SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965

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
WEEKLY REPORT

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
PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)



WEAPONS LOSSES




VIET CONG ACTIVITIES




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US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM

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VIET CONG ATTACKS




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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT

THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER 1965

INCIDENTS - VIET CONG




SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT

Through 30 September 1965

WEAPONS LOSSES - VIETNAM and VIET CONG




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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT

Through 30 September 1965

PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)



* WOUNDED NOT INCLUDED. VIET CONG FIGURES UNAVAILABLE.

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 September 1965

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action GVN	VC	Wounded in Action GVN	VC	Captured or Missing GVN	VC	Total Casualties GVN	VC	Weapons Losses GVN	VC
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	211	116	391	890	1396	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	688	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	205	1327	2016	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1480	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1870	1650	-	232	529	2473	2399	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	256	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	2223	2143	-	873	548	4065	2781	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	416	77	441	1015	2523	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1862	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	934	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2269	1046	2602	1575	-	540	406	3161	3008	1132	831
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074

-S1-

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Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2583	607	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	244	834	2623	4319	778	838
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2755	-	-
	1963	1882	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4237	1270	5701	12882	30896	5195	4049*
1963	17813	5665	20574	11488	3462	3137	4290	20290	28385	8267	5397
1964	28526	7477	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
**1965	20204	7895	21801	16368	-	6021	4380	30284	26191	13056	7369

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

**Through 30 September 1965

-S2-

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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 30 September 1965

2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 30 September 1963											
Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S			Co. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft	
		Small-Scale	BN. Size								
1962	1825	528	--	--	--	549	839	180	257	--	
Jan 1963	927	242	2	8	8	252	447	49	179	--	
1964	1770	218	3	2	2	223	1244	129	174	--	
1965	2206	57	1	5	5	63	1489	272	170	212	
1962	1460	480	--	--	--	500	613	137	210	--	
Feb 1963	788	181	1	13	13	195	433	69	91	--	
1964	2078	211	3	3	3	217	1389	201	271	--	
1965	1982	73	3	6	6	82	1411	267	91	131	
1962	1961	561	--	--	--	588	660	290	423	--	
Mar 1963	1282	333	0	11	11	344	653	131	154	--	
1964	2160	198	1	4	4	203	1632	158	167	--	
1965	2056	80	3	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164	
1962	1933	470	--	--	--	497	1024	220	192	--	
Apr 1963	1331	371	3	9	9	383	688	105	155	--	
1964	2284	211	3	6	6	220	1738	169	157	--	
1965	1860	38	4	1	1	43	1407	149	96	165	
1962	1825	490	--	--	--	528	892	154	251	--	
May 1963	1208	344	0	13	13	357	608	93	150	--	
1964	2143	170	2	3	3	175	1418	217	140	193	
1965	2263	40	11	7	7	58	1555	365	115	170	
1962	1477	385	1	21	21	407	736	157	222	--	
Jun 1963	1311	398	1	11	11	410	652	107	142	--	
1964	2062	128	2	10	10	140	1390	176	162	194	
1965	2597	62	6	1	1	69	1784	469	103	172	
1962	1564	437	1	10	10	448	735	158	223	--	
Jul 1963	1368	398	1	8	8	407	698	80	183	--	
1964	3045	166	12	7	7	185	2132	286	224	218	
1965	2269	37	6	0	0	43	1526	361	139	200	
1962	1642	368	0	9	9	377	885	146	233	--	
Aug 1963	1349	356	1	11	11	368	647	113	221	--	
1964	2580	107	3	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204	
1965	2498	38	5	9	9	52	1597	349	200	300	

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Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small-Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size	Total				
1962	1375	382	0	9	391	624	178	182	--
Sep 1963	1763	483	3	17	503	889	164	207	--
1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
1965	2473	19	5	7	31	1530	278	185	449
1962	1357	406	1	12	419	583	189	166	--
Oct 1963	1422	363	0	6	369	802	105	150	--
1964	2827	75	6	2	83	1790	480	197	277
1962	1311	411	3	7	421	614	144	132	--
Nov 1963	3182	631	3	11	645	1990	269	278	--
1964	1982	57	1	2	60	1391	247	109	175
1962	1346	375	1	8	384	670	107	185	--
Dec 1963	1882	258	0	3	261	1228	111	251	--
1964	2504	81	6	9	96	1719	318	128	243

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Composite Annual Totals

1962	19,076	5295	41	173	5509	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17,813	4358	15	121	4494	9735	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28,526	1732	46	55	1833	18656	3178	2080	1879
1965	20,204	438	56	33	527	13775	2750	1189	1963

Through 30 September 1965

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-S4-

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

4 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contributors to the Weekly and Monthly
Reports on the Situation in South Vietnam

SUBJECT : The Monthly Report

25X1A

1. After considerable reflection and study, and with the concurrence of [REDACTED], I have determined that the Monthly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam in its present form should be discontinued. I expect to include a note to this effect in the 6 October Weekly Report.

2. My judgment, which is shared by others among our contributors and readers, is that the substitution of a monthly report for one of the weekly reports results in a disruption of continuity in our reporting and analysis which is not compensated for by the meager benefits of a monthly review of the situation. I believe that longer-term trends can be adequately covered as necessary in retrospective analyses included in the body of the Weekly Report narratives, and that statistical trends can be charted as before by including monthly charts in every fourth Weekly. The intelligence memoranda independently and jointly produced by the three major contributors likewise fill the need for longer-term analysis.

3. I want to take this opportunity to announce my retirement from active participation in the preparation of the subcommittee's reports; [REDACTED] Chief, Far East Division, Office of Current Intelligence, will be taking over editorial and coordinating responsibility for the Weekly Report and should be consulted on any matters concerning its production. [REDACTED] telephone extension is 6051; his office address is Room 6G05, CIA Headquarters.

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
4. I will nevertheless continue to serve as a contact point in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence on Vietnam-related matters of a more general nature. For convenience's sake, delivery of Weekly contributions will continue to be addressed to me as stipulated in my memorandum of 27 August 1965.

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Assistant to the
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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